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Exploring Security: Discussions with Jane Guyer, Stuart Elden, Russ Castronovo, 
and Michael Hardt 
 
 
Jane Guyer 
Jane Guyer is the George Armstrong Kelly Professor and Department Chair of 
Anthropology at Johns Hopkins University. Her research is devoted to economic 
transformations in West Africa, particularly the productive economy, the division of labor 
and the management of money. Theoretically she focuses on the interface between formal 
and informal economies, and particularly the instabilities that interface gives rise. 
 
Interviewers: Mary Beth Schmid and Tom Loder 
 
DC: Since this is a security journal, we should look more at that. You sa id that you started 
within the past decade to look more at American questions, I think, about economic 
behavior. Maybe you could speak about how an American view of livelihood security and 
insecurity contrasts with a Nigerian or African view and what paral lels or what we could 
learn from one another. 
 
JG: I think that there certainly will be. One of the reasons that I started to even think about 
our situation, coming from Africa and having thought about the instabilities of Africa 
especially during the period under structural adjustment, and having collected a huge amount 
of newspaper articles that were commentaries on the economy in Nigeria and structural 
adjustment and military rule when life was very unstable. Then you have a great deal of 
attention to people trying to find landmarks, points of reference: Where are we in all of this 
as currency devalues and the price of this goes up and the availability of something 
disappears and so on. It was having been attentive to that that made me attentive to the 
change of rhetoric in our own public life that started in the last ten years. I started to read 
the newspaper with the eye of the anthropologist. What are people supposed to understand 
by that? Those kinds of questions. It is less that I thought that there was something specific 
about Africa that I thought we could learn from, which we can’t always, but rather the 
sensibility of having tried to understand the kinds of instabilities with which ordinary people 
in Africa lived in that period that made me very aware suddenly of our own concepts being 
not so self-evident, not so transparent, not so graspable. Even not so coherent, not internally 
coherent with each other: How is that supposed to add up with this one? How are they 
supposed to exist within the same frame of reference? This is how I did this paper on the 
near future that came straight out of my African notion that people are living day to day, 
week to week, month to month, year to year. But if all of our writing is about the distant 
future, the markets reaching equilibrium or clearing or the markets solving everything, what 
is supposed to go into that space? And this had come up in the Nigerian newspaper analyses. 
It was really that attentiveness to instability, in coherence that I began to think that there was 
at least a sensibility that needed to be applied to our own situation in the last ten years as this 
financial world has driven us in certain particular directions. And certainly, the livelihood 
question: How do you get from A to B? One day to the next? In some parts of our own 
economy there are people that I know at the bottom of the scale where getting your children 
to school on time when you have to get to work and you don’t have a car is difficult. You 
have to get a taxi and the taxi has to drop off several other people so that he can make 
money on the trip; he isn’t taking individual people. Everybody is trying to put that into a 
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budget that doesn’t include enough money to pay for the cab. You have an impasse 
situation. I wrote a little paper on this. Where you just can’t get to it. You get your children 
to school late, they get some kind of a black mark, you get a black mark as a bad mother, you 
end up somewhere in the welfare system as not being responsible and so on and so forth. 
Those kinds of incoherencies in life we can’t fit together. I think that we are seeing that in 
this country. 
 
DC: How do you see economic security relating to food security? It seems to me that there 
has been a somewhat incoherent situation since 2008. Was it an economic crisis and /or a 
food crisis? Additionally, how do you understand the implications of fuel as tied into this 
context and these social questions?  
 
JG: Bringing together the so-called essentials of life, food, shelter, medical care and transport 
is part of that. You can’t get medical care without getting in some kind of bus or on a 
motorcycle and going somewhere. So, the consonance of those prices and people’s livability 
is really very important. In Nigeria, I work in an area where people still produce a lot of their 
own food. They are commercial farmers, but they also produce for themselves and their own 
families. The food crisis doesn’t hit them as hunger in that particular area. We have to think 
about in particular configurations of these crises: Where does the pressure come on the food 
system? Is it in the regularity of access? Do people go without? In the cities in Nigeria, they 
had this saying that you only eat twice a day or twice one day and once the next. They had a 
rhythmic kind of little saying about that. There is the regularity of eating. There is the sharing 
of eating: Who gets to eat first if there is not enough to eat? Who gets to eat most? How is 
that conceptualized, justified, made acceptable as a micro-ethical resolution? Is it the people 
who are working hard who need the most food? Is it the children who are growing? I think 
that the food security issue raises its profile differently in different contexts. The price issue 
and the availability issue raise itself in this country with respect to people eating very cheap, 
prepared food. If you don’t have a kitchen or you have a kitchen with two burners or you 
don’t have pots and pans or whatever it is, then you are in that market no matter what. 
Saving all the coupons and doing all the cut-rate things that all applies to a very particular 
band of food. 
 
 
 
Stuart Elden  
Professor Elden teaches in the Department of Geography, Durham University , UK. His 
research is at the intersection of politics, philosophy and geography. In 2011 he was given 
the Royal Geographical Society Murchison Award for his contribution to political 
geography. 
 
Interviewers: Malene Herschend Jacobsen and Lee Bullock 
 
DC: Regarding the War on Terror, the question has been asked – how do we wage war on 
a feeling…terror?  There’s a rhetorical dimension in that formation.  And you point to this in 
Terror and Territory as well, in how the concepts terrorist, enemy combatant, legitimate and 
illegitimate states, and so on, have been encoded in legal and policy declarations. Does this 
rhetoric translate geographically, even if in just a broader kind of cultural imagination? 
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SE: I think that a number of people have said how do you declare war on—you called it a  
feeling, or an affect is another way that people have thought about these ideas and things.  
In a sense, I was less interested in that as a critique of what was happening, because there 
have been declarations of war in that sort of sense about other things that are sort of fairly 
intangible as say, the War on Poverty or the War on Drugs. It’s not a war in an obvious 
opponent, but it’s a war on something that structures or changes the way that relations in a 
society are working. 
 
I try to work through what terror might mean, how terror gets labeled.  And so you find  
things like the U.S. State Department list of terrorist organizations.  Almost all of those  
are self-determination movements.  Now, are they legitimate or illegitimate self- 
determination is almost a separate question.  These groups are all ones that are seeking  
control of territory that is currently controlled by a recognized state.  Now, that may groups 
like the Basque separatists in northern Spain, or it may be movements in China, or it may be 
in Chechnya in Russia or so on.  But they’re all seeking control of a political space, an area of 
territory that they’re trying to take away.  So what’s the relation between the terror and the 
territory?   
 
And there’s an etymological relation between those terms, but I think much more  
interestingly, there’s always a relation between those kinds of questions.  So, I try to  
make the argument that not only is the challenge to territorial situations something that is 
increasingly seen as terrorism, but that territory in itself is shot through with those kinds of 
relations of power, that the idea of drawing a line is already a kind of a violent 
inclusion/exclusion, policing it, controlling it, maintaining it, preventing it from being 
challenged.  These are all using various mechanisms of power, which could easily be 
understood as terror.   
 
So it was to try to think through those relations, not simply in the etymological sense that  
terror and territory share a similar root, as people sometimes suggest, but to work that 
through in a more practical register.  And so in a sense, I was more interested in that way of 
thinking rather than simply saying, the War on Terror, what does it mean?  It’s so vague as 
to include everything.  So it was trying to work those through in a more practical register, I 
suppose. 
 
DC: We’ve talked about how territory is often imagined as a bounded space and the state is 
imagined through its boundaries and through its borders. You’ve argued instead that we 
shouldn’t think of it as flat, but think of it as more three-dimensional. What work has been 
instructive in this regard? 
 
SE: In terms of the three-dimension, it would be the people I was mentioning before,  
particularly Peter Sloterdijk’s work that was useful in thinking that kind of question.  On 
territory itself, it’s a concept where there is actually relatively little that takes it as a difficult 
concept.  There’s loads of literature on particular territorial disputes, particular territorial 
arrangements, the history of the territory of a particular country, why the borders of this 
state here, why the states of the U.S. are the shape that they are.  There’s that kind of work.  
There’s a lot of work on that, but on taking territory as a concept, and saying that’s a 
problematic concept, there’s actually relatively little work.   
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And so it was taking people who had done work on related spatial categories, such as  
Edward Casey’s work on place, or some of the work on landscape like that of Denis 
Cosgrove, or the work that’s on space—Henri Lefebvre’s book, The Production of Space, for 
example.  Could you do something in a similar vein to that kind of work, with the concept of 
territory?  And that you maybe take some of the ideas, and the ways that they’ve approached 
those questions, to think through the question of territory.   
 
So people like Lefebvre are important.  Foucault too, though a lot of what Foucault says  
about territory is, I think, misleading.  But the kind of approach that Foucault has to the 
historic investigation of conceptions was very helpful for me in this work.  And then a more 
traditional history of political thought approach, people like Quentin Skinner, which is doing 
much more work around concepts like the state and sovereignty and political thought more 
generally.  But the kind of approach they were taking, I found really useful for thinking 
through territory.  
 
 
 
Russ Castronovo 
Dr. Castronovo teaches and researches American literature at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison.  His current project, Propaganda 1776, examines how the formation of popular 
consent and public opinion in early America relied on the robust dissemination of rumor, 
forgery, and invective. 
 
Interviewers: Lee Bullock and Christina Williams 
 
DC: Our theme for this issue is security. Let’s talk about this for a moment.  
 
RC: I think the conversation we’ve been having is all about security.  Can I send you an 
email and know that it’s going to be secure, or – imagine this table as the landscape – is my 
communication to you going to spread across the flatness of this table with nothing to check 
its flow?  It’s all about controlling and keeping information running in prescribed channels 
and what happens when the banks of a river swell and information suddenly leaps its banks 
and spreads across the flat geographical expanse that is what we can think of as the terrain 
the political.  Everything we’ve been saying is about how to keep information secure.  How 
to keep messages docile so that they don’t reproduce themselves.   
 
DC: So then, it becomes a question of whose information and about what.   
 
RC: Yes, but again, one of the things I do want to resist is that the “whose” information 
implies proprietorship.  And if we start asking about “what,” we miss the political aspect of 
communication.  The political is not so much about the content; it’s about the fact that the 
message circulates itself and that’s what becomes political.  The content sure can be 
embarrassing to a regime.  Wikileaks can make Hillary Clinton look bad; it can make Tony 
Blair look like he’s petulant.  All these things that happened are important, but I think what 
is also important and what we don’t recognize enough is the fact that those things circulate is 
in itself political –  apart from the message itself.  And that’s what’s insecure.  Once we begin 
to focus on the message, then we begin to do that depth thing.  What’s potentially more 
troubling is the fact that there’s a type of flow and dispersal and evenness that can beset 
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communication, then communications themselves become insecure.  Not so much the fact 
that you can hack my emails, as has happened to Sarah Palin’s emails. People wanted to find 
a kind of smoking gun or conspiracy.  Her emails turned out to more or less banal; instead 
what’s more important is that private emails of a government official can circulate apart 
from what they say.  The fact of circulation is the meaning.  You know one of the things I 
sometimes like to say is that it’s not the medium – the network is the message.   
 
DC: I’m trying to contextualize this in terms of what Brian Massumi calls the future birth of 
the affective fact.. .or the idea that some event is always on the horizon such that is always 
already happening. What happens to the circulation of information within that kind of a 
mindset. How does that information circulate in a structure of fear or a state of perpetual 
anxiety?   
 
RC: Propaganda, as we know, historically has always made the most of that—that fear and 
anxiety.  This is one of the danger points.  For instance, Joseph Goebbels in his diaries from 
1932-33 writes about the campaign to overtake the German state, and he is everywhere 
impressed with speed.  Printing pamphlets one after another, radio addresses delivered and 
broadcast quickly—it’s always about speed.  And so the problem becomes that these media 
don’t necessarily allow time for reflection.  They appeal to that type of future oriented fear 
and don’t allow for moments of deliberation (which, you will remember, I maligned that 
type of deliberative process).  One of the things about propaganda that interests me in the 
colonial era as well is that it ebbs and flows—how people and organizations such as the 
Boston Committee of Correspondents or the Sons of Liberty are controlling the rate at 
which information moves. So that sometimes they want to slow communication down to 
allow a message to resonate and sometimes they want to speed it up because American 
dissidents in the eighteenth century want to stoke popular passions.  Here’s where fear 
enters the picture:  Paine was  exploiting the fear that the future of America fears looks like 
the past of India.  And not just Paine—other unnamed propagandists or people like 
Benjamin Rush or John Dickinson who are all writing at this time under names like Rusticus 
and Americanus Junius or under pseudonyms alluding to  the English Civil War like 
Hampden share this concern of a temporal conjunction between America and British India.  
.  These propagandists are always spelling the future threat of the East India Company, and 
what they worry is that the East India Company is going in the future to reduce America to a 
state of vassalage similar to what has beset British India.  So I guess what I would say – to 
just put it in a nutshell –  is that fear of the future is so crucial, in the ways you have 
identified, and it depends upon retrospective examinations of the past and particular uses of 
that past, which is why literary historians and other “antiquarians” have such a critical and 
important role to play in public discourse of humanities.   
 
 
 
Michael Hardt 
Dr. Hardt is Professor of Literature and Italian Studies at Duke University and Professor of 
Political Literature at the European Graduate School. He studies globalization, political and 
cultural theory, and modern Italian literature. His co-publications with Antonio Negri 
include Empire, Multitude, and Commonwealth. 
 
Interviewers: Jason Grant and Vanessa Marquez 
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VM: Alright. Okay, so, um, I guess, we've been reading parts of Commonwealth and The 
Multitude in this Security seminar. So, how does security fit into this idea you've been 
elaborating with the multitude?  
 
MH: Mhm. Let me think of the right way to go. Okay, in some ways security has been used 
as a general framework for understanding contemporary issues of control. That security has 
been the legitimation of a generalized submission to forms of surveillance and domination. 
What do I mean by that? I mean something I think quite obvious. That the reasons we 
accept the contemporary security regime involving not only surveillance and information 
gathering in specialized institutional locations, but also in a much broader social field. What I 
mean by that is that if you start with a notion that, say similar to Foucault's thinking in 
Discipline and Punish, in which surveillance and the corresponding production of subjectivity is 
related to specific institutional sites, so that in the prison, there's one form of discipline and 
subjectivity, and one kind of very intense surveillance. In the hospital, there's another one; in 
the barracks, there's a third; in the school, there's another. All of these, both the forms of 
surveillance and the mechanisms of discipline, and the production of subjectivities are tied to 
its institutional space. One way of characterizing the contemporary security regime is a 
generalization of those logics, so that they're no longer confined to specific spaces. I think 
the examples of that are very easy and common. I mean, in the sense that one instead, of a 
panoptic architecture only of the prison, we have security cameras, more or less, in every 
classroom. I don't see one right here but certainly in all kinds of stores, in many countries. I 
think in Britain more than in the U.S. almost every street in urban areas has a security 
camera, so that there's a generalized surveillance. It's true, also about, I mean you can think 
of a number of other ways in which we are, even outside specific instances, outside of the 
airport check-ins, or when you apply for a job, or something but even just every time you 
use your credit card, or every time you visit a webpage your data is being recorded and being 
surveilled. I would put those things together and think of those as the way, or at least one 
way, that a concept of security, or security regime is becoming generalized.  
 
So, okay, all that was just preface. You said, what does that have to do with the multitude, or 
what does that have to do, like,…you know many times I too get tired of using concepts 
we've developed even if I think they're good. But anyway, rather than the multitude, let's just 
say, what does that have to do with any project of not only liberation but political action. I 
think that it's a clear objective that one would have to not refuse interactions with 
technologies but rather, find mechanisms that we can take control of in our interaction with 
them.  
 
Okay, that's one task, but maybe before that, I think even before we can propose  
mechanisms for autonomy with regard to those elements of the security regime, by which I 
mean surveillance, information gathering, the materials of control. Before we can even think 
about an autonomy of them, I think we have to find ways in a much more basic way that we 
can combat fear. I guess this is a very abstract proposition but, I guess, I'm working from the 
assumption that we accept all of these mechanisms of the security regime because of fear. 
You can say in part, but maybe this is the minor aspect fear of the ruling powers, like, why 
do I submit to that at the airport? Or, when a cop stops me, why do you submit to that? You 
submit to that because you're afraid of the police, you're afraid of being put in prison, you're 
afraid of the ruling powers. But, I think the more active fear, the more essential one here, is a 
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fear of abstract, unknown threats that you assume those ruling powers are protecting you 
from. All of this seemed so much more pressing during the Bush presidency but, it hasn't, in 
fact, declined very much since the end of the Bush presidency. The constant, I'm referring 
there to a constant public elaboration of threats, of terrorist threats, of unknown threats. It's 
hard not to think of that Rumsfeld line, "there are known unknowns and unknown 
unknowns." I mean, it was his way of imposing the necessity of a security regime because 
once the fear is located in unknown unknowns then it's so easily generalizable. Yeah, so I 
think that one, even before the question—this is where I was going a minute ago—which 
was that, even before addressing the question of how we can actually take control of these 
social mechanisms of information, one has to find a way first to combat that fear. It's not 
immediately clear how to do that. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
